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THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN DRUG CONTROL
JOHN KAPLAN*
SELF-HARMING CONDUCT AND SOCIETY
The role of the law in drug control is intimately related to the
broader problem of the place of the law in preventing an individual
from engaging in conduct which can harm only himself. Before con-
sidering drug control, then, there will be several advantages in under-
taking a lengthy discussion of the broader issue. Not only will this
allow appreciation of the problem in a broader perspective, but it will
facilitate an approach to the extremely emotional drug area by a less
well travelled, quieter, and more rational route. It is, perhaps, a longer
journey, but it should be a smoother one.
Typically the use of the law to prevent conduct which harms only
the actor himself is distinguished from the use of the law as a means
of preventing the individual from harming others, including society
at large. In practice, however, this is not an easy distinction to draw,
for there are few actions in which one can engage that threaten harm
only to himself.
The purest example of laws aimed at such conduct are the statutes
which require the driver of a motorcycle to wear a protective helmet.,
It is true that one can argue that the helmet really protects others,
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since it shields the motorcyclist from thrown pebbles which might
make him lose control and injure innocent pedestrians or automobile
drivers.2 Though this approach makes the problem easier, it is disin-
genuous. As a result, many courts and commentators have refused to
take it and have assumed that the helmet protects only the cyclist
himself.3
Though the helmetless cyclist does not expose others to any appre-
ciable physical danger, he does drive in a society that is committed
to preventing people from dying of their injuries. Thus, rather than
allowing the cyclist to die unnecessarily, society is prepared to under-
take the enormous expense of treating him until he either expires or
recovers. In Professor Robert Bartels' apt phrase, the helmetless cycl-
ist exposes others to "public ward" harm-the danger of having to
treat him should he not be killed outright.' It is on this theory that
society feels it has the right to demand that he do his share to protect
himself.
The expense and inconvenience that the helmetless driver may
cause does not, however, stop at public ward harm. Insofar as his
failure to wear a helmet results in his own injury, he may force society
to assume the cost of his neglected responsibilities to others. Here the
issue cannot be avoided by saying that it is all society's fault for not
letting him die in the street at minimal cost, because his responsibili-
ties must still be fulfilled. As an emotional matter, moreover, nonsup-
port justifications for laws which attempt to prevent self-harming
conduct often command considerably more power than do public
ward justifications. Thus, despite the enormous public ward justifica-
tions for halting alcohol abuse, one of the most powerful Prohibition-
ist posters contained a drawing of a saloon with the father drinking
at the bar while his clean, but poorly dressed, little daughter stood in
the doorway saying, "Father, Father, please come home. Mother
needs you." The same public interest which underlies non-support
laws, then, can also justify helmetless cyclist laws-at least in the case
of those who owe someone a support obligation.5
2. See, e.g., State v. Fetterly, 254 Ore. 47, 49-50, 456 P.2d 996-97 (1969).
3. See Note, 30 OHIO ST. L.J., supra note I, at 366-69. See generally Linde, Without "Due
Process"- Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 ORE. L. REV. 125, 178 (1970).
4. R. Bartels, Better Living Through Legislation: The Control of Mind-Altering Drugs
(unpublished manuscript).
5. The case of the helmetless cyclist prohibition, however, is both stronger and weaker than
the more general non-support laws. It is weaker for two reasons. First, insofar as the law applies
to those who do not owe anyone a support obligation or who leave a sufficient estate to meet
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In addition to the public ward and non-support justifications for
forbidding conduct which on first glance would appear to harm only
the actor, a further justification exists which might be called the
"modelling" justification. Modelling is the psychological term for the
process by which one repeats a type of behavior one sees in others.
Modelling of behavior may thus occur where the watcher first learns
that the behavior which he had thought impossible can indeed be
performed; where the watcher, by observing, learns how to do it;
where he simply gets the idea from watching; or where he, for any one
of many reasons, imitates the action.' It is true, of course, that the
same values which underlie the freedom of communication may inter-
fere with preventing the harm caused by modelling. The individual
who models the helmetless cyclist does so without coercion, and, apart
from the indirect harms discussed, he harms only himself. Neverthe-
less, where those persons society tries to protect from modelling are
children, the fact that the helmetless cyclist in a causal sense may have
caused the modelling, which in turn might lead to injury, may be very
significant. Children are regarded as much more likely than adults to
model dangerous conduct, and we certainly acknowledge a greater
responsibility to protect them from harm.
The final justification by which some may find social harm in
conduct which appears to harm only the actor might be called the
"categorical imperative" justification. This relies on the fact that
although an act might harm only the actor if performed by relatively
few people, it could cause harm to everyone if it were performed by
such obligations, it is obviously too broad. Second, the fact is that most helmetless cyclists do
not suffer injury for want of a helmet. At most, they take the risk that in some small percentage
of cases they will be prevented from fulfilling their support obligations. Even if legislators feel
better able to evaluate this risk than the cyclist, it here seems a much weaker case for prohibiting
one's wilful default on his support obligations.
On the other hand, the very fact that the helmetless cyclist does not intend to default on his
support obligations, but merely takes a risk of not being able to meet them, is perhaps a reason
for greater, not less, involvement by the law. There is ample evidence that many human beings
discount the likelihood of low-probability harmful events more than does any rational legisla-
ture. See W. Edwards & L. Phillips, Man as Transducer for Probabilities in Bayesian Command
and Control Systems (December 26, 1962) (unpublished paper presented at symposium of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia). The law might then
rationally prohibit small risks while allowing greater ones on the theory that in the latter case
the risk was sufficiently obvious that it could rely on the rationality of the risk taker, while in
the former, intervention of the criminal law is necessary to cause a proper weighting of the risks.
6. A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 118-204 (1969).
7. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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almost all. This justification is not heard in the helmetless cyclist case,
but it is heard with respect to some sexual and drug laws.8 The picture
which is called to mind is that of a nation where most of the popula-
tion is homosexual-in which case there would be an enormous popu-
lation implosion with consequent economic catastrophe-or where
most of the nation is "stoned" on drugs. It is undeniable that society
has a strong interest in avoiding the economic disaster of so many
withdrawn from productive work. In-both cases, however, the justifi-
cation is often attenuated by two facts. First, there is not generally
any reason to believe that, in the absence of laws justified by categori-
cal imperative reasoning, the forbidden conduct would in fact become
so widespread-the taste that impels the action may be esoteric. Sec-
ond, the fact that conduct might produce a social catastrophe if en-
gaged in by almost all does not necessarily imply that the conduct will
be in any way harmful to society if engaged in by a relative few. So
long as the birthrate is felt to be too high, the practicing homosexuals
who thereby reduce it do no harm at all, and the economies of scale
in American industry are such that withdrawal of a reasonable num-
ber of producers and consumers will similarly have no detrimental
effect. The categorical imperative justification, therefore, may be fal-
lacious, or it may simply be one way of dramatizing a harm which
actually exists, by multiplying it manyfold.
Secondary Harms and the Criminal Law
Unless it is necessary to distinguish among them, public ward,
non-support, modelling and categorical imperative harms can all be
subsumed under the heading of secondary harms. It is interesting to
note that the majority of efforts to prohibit conduct which, on first
glance, appears to harm only the actor himself are rationalized as a
means of preventing secondary harms, rather than as efforts to pro-
tect people from their own folly.' Insofar as the law acts to penalize
the actor who has not taken proper care of himself, it hurts rather
8. See, e.g., Grinspoon, Marilhuand, 221 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 17,21 (Dec. 1969).
9. That is not, of course, to say that there are not situations where we are willing to invoke
the law simply to protect people from self-inflicted harm. The juvenile court will imprison
juvenile runaways under a parens patriae theory, Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1970), and those who are mentally ill will be civilly
committed, even if they are dangerous only to themselves. While the person to be protected from
himself is not under age, "ill," or a member of another group with a similar claim to sympathy,
however, society acts for its own benefit rather than his. It must, therefore, still be able to point
to a secondary harm to justify the law.
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than helps him. To the extent that societal resources are expended to
prevent people from simply harming themselves, moreover, a type of
public welfare program is initiated. Such use of governmental re-
sources to improve the lot of a minority is never popular and the case
in support thereof is weak indeed where the minority is neither re-
garded as especially worthy nor desirous of the help.
No one argues today that all risks of secondary harm should be
prohibited by the criminal law. The obvious secondary harm resulting
from such almost universally performed acts as overeating or poor
nutrition is the reductio ad absurdum of such arguments. The interest-
ing question, then, is whether these types of harm are a sufficient
reason for society to intervene in any case. The classic statement
opposing intervention is that of John Stuart Mill that "[tlhe only
purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant."' 0 Mill himself believed that an "indirect" harm, which
would include the secondary harms discussed, was not a "harm to
others" within the meaning of his statement."
Unfortunately, one can read Mill's pronouncements again and
again without discovering any substantial effort at a utilitarian calcu-
lus to support his position, and the closest Mill came to a general
reason was a reductio ad absurdum argument. This was stated in two
forms. First, that:
[s]o monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference
with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it
acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps, to that of
holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them .... 1
And second that:
[t]he doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's
moral, intellectual, even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant,
according to his own standard.13
These arguments both focus on the lack of standards available
once society undertakes to prevent a person from harming himself.
The standards problem, moreover, is compounded when one attempts







conduct of his choice. Merely because protecting the public from
secondary harms could logically justify a vast range of governmental
interferences with individual liberty, and merely because we could
define secondary harms as including anything lessening the full devel-
opment of an individual's perfection, this does not mean that such
interference is always improper. The main deficiency with the reductio
ad absurdum arguments is actually a practical one. In the great ma-
jority of cases, the individual's freedom will not be interfered with
directly simply because such regulation would be impossible to en-
force without the imposition of an absolute police state. 4 Indeed, the
motorcycle helmet example is one of the few prohibitions on an indi-
vidual's conduct that might be enforced at reasonable cost.
Mill's thesis can perhaps be better defended on a somewhat differ-
ent ground. When the legislature makes a decision to protect society
from secondary harms by criminalizing individual conduct, it gener-
ally overestimates the enforceability of its decrees. 5 Where the law's
reach exceeds its grasp, it may impose serious costs upon society
which can far outweigh the expectable good that complete enforce-
ment might bring. For this reason, it could be argued that, as a
prudential matter, we would be better off adhering to Mill's principle
as a rule of legislative self-denial. In other words, once protection
against secondary harms is begun, the difficulties of knowing which
are appropriate occasions for legislative action are so great that it
would be better to eschew the effort entirely.
Simple legislative misjudgment as to the enforceability of the law,
moreover, is not the only problem. The issue of protecting one from
harm to himself usually involves two sensitive political issues-the
interrelationship between law and morals and the use of the law to
stigmatize unpopular groups. As to the first, few people deny that
there is a connection between morality and the law. Probably the
majority agree with Professor Herbert Packer that, in general, it is a
necessary condition of the proper use of the criminal law that the
conduct prohibited be seen as immoral.16 The words "in general," of
course, are quite important. The helmetless cyclist statute, for exam-
ple, if enforceable, may be a proper use of the criminal law even
though there is nothing more immoral in helmetless cycling than in
14. PACKER 156, 270-72.




mountain climbing. The real problem, however, is with the converse
proposition-that the immorality of conduct is a sufficient condition
for declaring it illegal. The proposition that the law may be used to
enforce morality without any corresponding societal benefit, other
than the reduction of that immorality, is complex. 17 The issue does
not arise where there is harm threatened to someone other than the
immoral actor, because then the reduction of harm to others would
simply be regarded as a sufficient social benefit. Where no such harm
exists, however, the law must be justified either as a method of pro-
tecting against secondary harms or as a means of reducing the fre-
quency of the immorality itself. Both justifications are extremely elas-
tic, and the ingenious legislator can usually find both in any conduct
he seeks to proscribe. The significant point is that avoidance of sec-
ondary harm can easily provide a rationalization for prohibiting con-
duct which is widely felt offensive on moral, but not on other grounds.
The fact is that most of the situations where the criminal law is used
to prevent an individual from harming himself are situations where
his conduct is also felt to be immoral. There is thus an ever present
temptation to enforce a dominant morality without looking to see
whether the conduct to be prohibited is sufficiently harmful in terms
of secondary harms, or whether the law is itself enforceable; and it is
for just this reason that political pressures may further compound
legislative misjudgment. The desire to enjoy the political popularity
which comes from opposing sin may push legislators into enacting
laws which even further exceed the possibility of enforcement. But,
Professor Packer's sage advice that "if a legislator can think of no
better reason to proscribe conduct than that he (or his constituency)
abhors it, he had better think twice about doing it,"' s may, as a
political matter, be difficult to follow-especially where the legislator
has the additional justification of attempting to lessen secondary
harms.
The second political factor which may exert popular pressure to
extend laws aimed at secondary harms much further than is rationally
justifiable in utilitarian terms involves the stigmatization of unpopu-
lar groups in society. 9 Studies of the coming of the anti-opium, 2
17. Compare P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959), with H. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963).
18. See PACKER 266.
19. J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE 13-19 (1963).




alcohol 2' and marijuana2" laws have, for instance, indicated that in
each case the drug prohibition was only part of the story. A major
part of the emotional effort to pass these laws was generated by a
dislike for the groups which were, in the public mind, associated with
the drug. The history of our drug control efforts includes the passage
of other laws which had, and were intended-at least by a sizeable
number of their supporters-to have, the effect of stigimatizing the
Chinese (in the case of opium),2 the urban Catholic (in the case of
alcohol) 24 and the Mexican (in the case of marijuana). 5 The likelihood
that in emotional times a legislature will use secondary harm justifica-
tions as a cloak for joining in the stigmatization of an unpopular
group, as well as demonstrating its opposition to sin, is, perhaps,
another reason for the adoption of Mill's view as a prudent self-
restraining principle.
The likelihood that a law ostensibly attempting to protect against
secondary harm will also be based on a labelling of conduct as immo-
ral and an effort to stigmatize certain groups has one further conse-
quence. Those at whom the law is directed may not agree that their
conduct is immoral or that their groups are properly stigmatized and,
in a host of ways, may make enforcement of the law even more
difficult. Indeed, such laws may lead to resentment even where they
are not based on the immorality of conduct or group stigmatiza-
tion-take, for instance, the helmetless cyclist case. There is, more-
over, no doubt that the vast majority of harms which an individual
may do to himself-eating too much, exercising too much, not exer-
cising enough, sky-diving or mountain climbing-are in no way for-
bidden by the law. As a result, in those atypical situations where the
criminal law does attempt to make an individual take better care of
himself, he will feel that he is unfairly treated as compared to all
others who are not forced to take similar precautions. In a sense, he
will be right. The laws requiring one to protect himself are little islands
of criminal liability in a vast sea of freedom to injure one's self.
It should be noted finally that where the secondary harms with
which we are concerned are limited to public ward and non-support
21. See J. GUSFIELD, supra note 19, at 27-29.
22. Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into
the Legal History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1010-16 (1970).
23. T. DUSTER, supra note 20, at 10-11.
24. See J. GUSFIELD, supra note 19, at 103, 139.
25. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 22, at 1012-16.
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harms, it might be that a system of taxes or license payments would
serve society's purposes better than would a criminal prohibition.
These harms are, for the most part, monetarily calculable and actu-
arially predictable. All that need be done is to require insurance
against the threatened harms as a condition of engaging in the pro-
scribed conduct.26 Where these insurance requirements are enforcea-
ble, Mill's principle might be defensible on a wholly different theory.
The demands of Pareto optimality, 27 if not a respect for liberty, re-
quire that a prohibition not be used where the only harm to society is
of the public ward and non-support type, simply because a narrower
law could always be enacted preventing these activities only by those
who had not made proper financial provision for the risks they were
taking.
In any event, even if it cannot be proven that harm to the actor
and secondary harms are never a sufficient reason for the legislature
to prohibit conduct, it should be realized that the helmetless cyclist
counter-example is an anomoly in balancing the advantages and dis-
advantages of such a paternalistic law. Helmetless driving is done in
the open and the presence or absence of a helmet is extremely easy to
determine. As a result, one would expect that this law could be en-
forced with relatively minor expenditures. This might not necessarily
be the case. Under some conditions, the expenditures of enforcing the
helmetless cyclist prohibition might exceed the saving to society in
terms of secondary harm. 21 If this were the case, a rational legislature
might repeal the law after a sufficient period of trial. The legislature
could well decide that even though a rational calculus would, on first
glance, favor forbidding helmetless cycling, the imperfections of the
subjects of the law which prevented them from realizing their own best
interests, tipped the balance against such a law.
The helmetless cyclist for yet another reason represents the sim-
26. In the case of the cyclist, he would be allowed on the road without a helmet only with
an extra license plate signifying that he had made provision to compensate for any public ward
or non-support harms his activity might cause.
27. "Pareto optimality" refers to the view that a change may be seen as desirable in terms
of economic welfare only if it benefits someone without injuring anyone else. See J. DUE & R.
CLOWER, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 461 (5th ed. 1966).
28. A situation might arise, for example, where the law had not been enforced for some while
(and therefore) there were many helmetless cyclists on the road. It might then be fairly expensive
to prosecute sufficient numbers of them to deter the remainder, since it would take time for the
information that the law was being enforced to sink in. It is also conceivable that some cyclists
might regard it a matter of principle not to wear a helmet, or, principles aside, feel that the
thrill of going helmetless was worth the inconvenience of apprehension.
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plest case where the legislature might attempt to protect an individual
from the consequences of his own folly-because the prohibition
works against the individual cyclist himself. A considerably different
issue exists when legal threats are exerted not against the individual
who is himself harmed by his conduct, but against someone else who
also is in a position to avoid the harm.
Analytically, the use of seatbelts by motorists presents an issue
quite similar to that of helmets by motorcyclists. There are, however,
two major differences. First, a law which made criminal a motorist's
or passenger's failure to wear seatbelts would obviously be almost
impossible to enforce. Whether or not one is wearing seatbelts can
only be determined from inside, or at least very close to, the automo-
bile, and the difficulties of checking millions of drivers would be
insurmountable. It is true, of course, that after an accident one might
be able to determine which of the injured was not wearing seatbelts.
It is hard to believe, however, that the criminal law operating at this
time could exercise any substantial deterrent effect over and above the
effect of the increased injuries.
The second difference is that in the case of the seat belt problem,
power can be exerted upon the vehicle manufacturer. Requiring a
motorcyclist to purchase a helmet may not help at all in getting him
to use it. Indeed, the helmet is so easily separable from the motorcycle
that checking to see whether the cyclist had a helmet would be no
easier than checking to see that he was wearing one. Although a
motorist cannot be made to wear a seatbelt, society can, on the other
hand, make sure that he at least has the option to do so. 2 Laws
requiring safety equipment are far easier to enforce against the auto-
mobile manufacturing industry than against the helmetless cyclist.
There are so few automobile companies, what they sell is so public
and they are so unlikely to act on principle, that there would be little
difficulty in requiring seatbelts to be installed in each car sold.3 0
In all cases where an attempt is made to govern the seller, rather
29. See, e.g., Act of December 13, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-201, §§ 1-3, 77 Stat. 361, repealed
with savings provision, Act of September 9, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 117(a), (e), 80 Stat.
718, 727; National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1397-
98 (1970). The current regulations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act are set
forth in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.21 (1971).
30. If more than the preservation of the opportunity to wear seatbelts were desired, one
could also require an airbag apparatus, a buzzer which would make an annoying sound when-
ever the car was driven with the seatbelts unfastened or even seatbelts somehow connected to
the ignition so that the car could not be'driven unless the seatbelts were used. Indeed, safety
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than the buyer, it can be argued that concern is transferred from the
prevention of harm to one's self (including secondary harms) to that
of prevention of harm to others. This reasoning, however, would not
have placated John Stuart Mill in the least. In referring to a prohibi-
tion statute which attempted to protect the consumer by restricting
sale of alcohol, Mill said that "the infringement complained of is not
on the liberty of the seller, but that of the buyer and consumer; since
the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine, as purposely
make it impossible for him to obtain it."31
It is true that the liberty of the automobile buyer is infringed when
it is impossible for him to buy a car without seatbelts. Utilitarians,
however, do not regard freedom as an absolute value before which all
others must give way. Rather, it would be considered as one value
among many and should the balancing of values favor an infringe-
ment of the buyer's freedom by a restriction on the seller, the utili-
tarian will not fail to impose that restriction merely because a direct
restriction on the buyer would have been impractical.
Consensual Crimes and the Criminal Law
Both the one-party case of the helmetless cyclist, where the law
seeks to operate directly upon the individual to make him take care
of himself, and the two-party case of the factory installed seatbelts,
where the law seeks to operate on the seller to force him to make the
consumer take better care of himself, are classified under the same
heading-"victimless" crimes. This term is somewhat unfortunate.
First of all, if secondary harms are considered, there may very well
be a victim other than the actor himself.3 2 Second, the term victimless
crime has a somewhat bad odor in academic circles. It has been used
particularly with respect to the crimes of drunkenness, prostitution,
abortion, gambling and drug offenses which have contributed so heav-
ily to what Professor Sanford Kadish calls the crisis of over-
criminalization. Finally, in a very real sense, the victim of even a
equipment of this nature will be required in the near future. Passenger cars manufactured from
Jan. I, 1972 to Aug. 14, 1973 must be equipped with a seat belt warning system that activates
an audible and visible warning for one minute if seat belts are not fastened. 36 Fed. Reg. 4600-
08, 12858-60 (1971). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has also proposed
regulations requiring that manufacturers install seatbelts with ignition interlocks during the
period from Aug. 15, 1973 to Aug. 15, 1975. 36 Fed. Reg. 19254-55 (1971). After Aug. 15,
1975, all passenger cars are to be equipped with a passive restraint system (such as the "air
bag"). Id.
31. MILL 106.
32. See PACKER 151-52, 267.
33. See Kadish, supra note 15.
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knowing purchase of an automobile without proper safety equipment
may be the purchaser himself if he is subsequently injured. In all
probability, the term "consensual" is a better way to describe these
crimes.3 From a law enforcement point of view, the important thing
about such crimes is that all parties consent to the transaction, and,
regardless of whether they may later regret it, they do not bring the
matter to police attention at the time.3 5
In any event, whether one calls the crimes victimless or consen-
sual, it must be admitted that there are both an enormous number of
them on the statute books and that most of them are not very contro-
versial. Whenever the law goes beyond requiring mere disclo-
sure-such as in the Flammable Fabrics Act, 38 building codes 37 and
the laws against practicing law, 38 medicine 39 or plumbing" without a
license-it is protecting the buyer of goods or services from himself,
regardless of whether it acts upon him directly or upon the seller.
Indeed, even those who most often decry victimless crimes in general
are those most likely to demand that we do more "to protect the
consumer." For instance, regulations requiring automobile manufac-
turers to add collapsible steering columns," which protect only the
buyer, although they would not command his loyalty at their prices
in the market, are in fact attempts to add new victimless crimes. It is
true that such enactments can often be defended as attempts to force
the automobile manufacturers to take advantage of economies of
scale in the manufacture of safety devices. In this case, then, the law
can be regarded as a kind of subsidy to those who wish the safety
equipment to be paid for by those who do not. Interestingly enough,
34. Consensual transactions, thus, are "victimless" in the sense that they are difficult to
detect because of the absence of vocal victims. See PACKER 267.
35. See Kadish, supra note 15, at 160.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1192-93 (1970).
37. See, e.g., PALO ALTO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE Ch. 16, §§ 16.04.010 -.070 (1971);
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNIFORM BUILDING CODE (1970 ed.);
SOUTHERN BUILDING CODE CONGRESS, SOUTHERN STANDARD BUILDING CODE (1969 ed.). See
generally Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1965).
38. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6060, 6062 (West Supp. 1971); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13, § I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAW § 476-a (MeKinney 1968).
39. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2141 (West Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch,
91, § 16i (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6513 (McKinney 1953).
40. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 116.63 (Smith-Hurd 1966); PALO ALTO CAL.,
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 16, § 16.08.090 (1968).
41. See note 30supra.
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Mill, in what some might regard as an orgy of consistency, also
opposed heavier taxation of dangerous substances42 and, hence, would
clearly have opposed this type of measure to protect the consumer.
Although most people perhaps do not realize it, minimum wage
laws43 also fall under the general heading of consensual crimes. Of
course, some may consider the wage-earner who works for less than
the minimum wage as himself some kind of victim. The problem with
this is that it rests on one of two theories. The first is that he would
otherwise work for the higher, minimum wage. If this is true, his own
foolishness is to blame, and the essence of victimless crime is protect-
ing people from their own foolishness. The second is that he is work-
ing because he needs the money-necessitous men are not free men.
The difficulty with this view is that the worker driven by economic
necessity to work for less than the minimum wage is no more driven
than the compulsive gambler or the drug dependent individual. None-
theless, although he is willing in this sense to work for, and his em-
ployer is willing to pay him that wage, our laws attempt to prevent
the bargain just as they would prevent a bargain reached between a
prostitute and her customer or a bookie and his.
If one then supports rules outlawing sales of flammable fabrics,
laws against practice of medicine without a license or bargains that
violate the minimum wage law, he cannot denounce without qualifica-
tion victimless crime. The real problem with victimless crimes, as
Professor Herbert Packer has pointed out so cogently, is that some
of them produce such enormous difficulties of law-enforcement that
as a practical matter they do more harm than good.44 In order to
determine whether this is the case as to any particular crime, consider-
able care must be used to look at the effects of the criminal law and
to attempt computation of the costs and benefits it brings about.
As an initial proposition, however, a number of generalizations
can be made. First, where the law imposes its major burden on the
individual to force him to protect himself, it will, in general, involve
such difficulties of enforcement as to be unenforceable. Typically, the
conduct will be private and will come to light only rarely, and then
either because of the most intrusive type of investigation,4 5 or after the
harm that the law attempted to protect against has already been
42. MILL 113-15, 119.
43. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-18 (1970).
44. PACKER 151-52, 273-75.
45. See Kadish, supra note 15, at 161.
Vol. 1971:10651
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
done-in which case the law will be in the position of compounding
that harm with criminal penalties against one already injured. Indeed,
the helmetless driving law appears to be the only law designed to
protect an individual from himself (or society from secondary harms)
that is actually enforceable.
On the other hand, when the law attempts to protect individuals
from harming themselves, or from causing secondary harm, by trans-
ferring its pressure from the individual actor himself to someone
else-typically the seller of some commodity-it may or may not be
enforceable at a reasonable cost. Where the law would impinge upon
legitimate businesses which are not too numerous to watch and where
it does not generate significant economic pressures toward its own
violation, it may very well be enforceable. However, as the number
of independent businesses which need to be watched increases and the
economic incentive to violate the law increases, society comes more
and more to the type of victimless crimes that have given the criminal
system such a headache.
Finally, as Professor Packer has pointed out, in those areas of
victimless crimes where, on the above analysis, the criminal law is
most appropriate-it is also least needed.4" Civil penalties, which are
far more efficient to impose, will allow a better deployment of so-
ciety's coercive resources. Moreover, as they will generally be im-
posed within the context of a business activity, they will involve far
fewer dangers of invasion of the citizen's privacy than may occur if
imposed upon individuals.4 7
There is one further objection that should be noted to all the laws
thus far discussed. Given the present economic and political institu-
tions, any attempt to protect individuals from themselves may sooner
or later be used by the powerful economic interests thereby unleashed
to lessen competition and to harm society as a whole. Certainly, a
great deal of the recent literature concerning occupational licensing,
building codes and the like supports this view.4 Similarly, although
automobile safety requirements are still in their infancy, there are
already substantial allegations that the safety standards are being
designed to protect American, and politically influential, automobile
companies from foreign competition. 9 Finally, it has even been al-
46. PACKER 253.
47. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-61 (1962).
48. P. MOORE, ECONOMIC EFFEcrs OF LICENSING (1963).
49. Cf. Washington Post, Dec. 6, 1970, at A-1, A-14.
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leged that the helmet manufacturers have been far more influential
than the analysis of secondary harms in securing helmetless cyclist
legislation. Although one cannot call the case proven at this point, one
can soften any zeal to protect against secondary harm by the realiza-
tion that, given the apparent weakness of legislators and administra-
tors, it is at least possible that the government itself actually needs
the protection from its own folly which only a rigid adherence to
Mill's principle could bring.
Discussion thus far has involved the kinds of conduct which are
normally classed as protection against harm to one's self. Even where
the law makes criminal the action of the seller, it does so as a means
of preventing the buyer from injuring himself. Note, however, how all
of the arguments previously considered change when attention is
turned toward conduct that threatens harm to others. In the automo-
bile case, for example, if concern were with automobiles with defective
brakes rather than those without seatbelts, very different issues would
arise. There would then be little hesitation to make it a crime to drive
a car with defective brakes,50 even though'this might be almost as
difficult to enforce, in the sense of catching a high percentage of
violators, as would be a law against the failure to use seatbelts. Detec-
tion would not, first of all, be quite so difficult, because we would have
someone other than the police to bring the matter to public atten-
tion-the one injured by a car with defective brakes. Second, it might
very well be that after an accident which revealed the defective brakes,
the criminal law would actually be able to increase the punishment
significantly over that of the accident-at least in those cases where
the driver was not himself hurt. Third, it cannot here be argued, as it
was in the case of public ward and non-support harms,-" that insur-
ance could eliminate the need for such a law. It is one thing to say
that the helmetless cyclist or seatbeltless driver can insure against the
secondary harm caused; it is very different, however, to say that the
driver with defective brakes can physically injure people and thrust
the insurance on them in lieu of his own preventative measures.
Fourth, if one engages habitually in conduct dangerous to others, it
may be economical to imprison him, though it would almost certainly
not be where the only concern was with reducing secondary harms.
50. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 40001 (West Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2,
§§ 211, 234 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1971); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 375.1, 375.32 (McKinney
1970).
5 1. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
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Finally, and, perhaps most importantly, where any activity threatens
harm to the actor himself, his own sense of self-protection will gener-
ally lead him to act so as to minimize the harm to society as well as
to himself. Thus, both the helmetless cyclist and the driver with faulty
brakes will be restrained by self-preservation, since all that is neces-
sary to make this restraint on behavior effective is that there be, in
fact, a danger to the actor. Where an activity threatens harm to others
only, however, there may be no such restraint and the criminal law
may be the only force that makes the harmful activity unprofitable.
This is probably the case in the widest range of criminal prohibitions
which protect either the property or the person of others.
DRUGS AND CONSENSUAL CRIMES
The interrelations between the felt dangers of drugs and the meth-
ods used to control them are, as will 6e seen, extremely complex. The
basic problem, nonetheless, is familiar. The commonly heard argu-
ment on behalf of minimal drug control is that "it's my body and I
can do what I want with it so long as I don't hurt anyone." This, of
course, is simply another way of phrasing Mill's principle. Indeed, the
entire problem of drug control is for the most part a special case
within the problem of the regulation of conduct which harms only the
actor himself. The dangers presented by most drug users are not too
dissimilar from those of the helmetless cyclist, and the controls im-
posed upon sellers of automobiles without safety equipment are not
too dissimilar to those placed upon sellers of drugs. Before going into
the similarities and differences, however, a definitional problem must
be discussed.
What Are "Drugs?"
A typical pharmacological definition is that a drug is a substance
which, when taken into the body, alters the structure or function of
any part of the organism.5 Although this is a very broad definition,
it is important to avoid too narrow a focus. Otherwise one incorpo-
rates concepts of medical helpfulness-that, for example, an amphe-
tamine used as a diet pill under the supervision of a doctor is not a
drug, but that when taken as a pep pill without prescription it is.
Similarly, concepts of harmfulness must not be included. Otherwise
52. Modell, Mass Drug Catastrophes and the Roles of Science and Technology, 156
SCIENCE 346 (1967). See generally NOWLIs 5-7.
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drugs may be classified according to their social utility-alcohol, for
example, is often said not to be a drug simply because it is not
harmful (which, of course, it is-or can be) and because of its wide
social use. 3 Finally, the definition of what is a drug must avoid con-
sideration of the legality of the substance. Legality is merely a social
concept which has been applied to nature. To talk in general about
how the law treats both legal and illegal drugs will require a discussion
of an enormous range of substances-including coffee, tobacco, al-
cohol, the cyclamates, antibiotics, amphetamines, marijuana and her-
oin.s4
The Damages Caused by Drugs
Social concern with drugs arises, of course, because of the feeling
that they damage either their user or others. With respect to the
damage to others there is a sizeable range of harms to consider.
Contemporary scientific opinion implicates alcohol,55 amphetam-
ines," and barbiturates 57 as playing a causal role in a significant
number of assaults by their users by reducing inhibitions, weakening
judgment or some other means.58 Tobacco is another drug whose use
poses a danger to non-users 59-principally through loss of life and
property from fires caused by smokers. Heroin also exerts sizable
costs upon the non-user, since the addict will typically commit large
numbers of property crimes to support his habit6°-though, as will be
seen, the law is itself a contributor to these crimes."' Finally, there are
53. See NOWLIS 6, 87.
54. See generally GOODMAN & GILMAN; Modell, supra note 52, at 347-51.
55. BLUM 289, KAPLAN 265-70; Blum, Mind Altering Drugs and Dangerous Drugs:
Alcohol, in U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: DRUNKENNESS 28, 40 (1967); Wolfgang & Strohm, The Rela-
tionship between Alcohol and Criminal Homicide, 17 Q.J. OF STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 411 (1956).
56. See Ellinwood, Assault and Homicide Associated with Amphetamine Use, 127 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1170 (1971), describing the histories of 13 persons who committed homicide while
intoxicated with amphetamines. The author speculates whether the reported incidence of amphe-
tamine-induced assaults would be higher if physicians were more fully aware of the problem.
Id. at 1175. See also BLUM 289.
57. See generally NOWLIS 84-85.
58. See generally Blum, Drugs, Behavior, and Crime, 374 ANNALS 135 (1967).
59. See BLOOMQUIST 188-91; GOODMAN & GILMAN 588-92.
60. BLUM 288-89, KAPLAN 240.
61. With respect to heroin, society has adopted a categorical imperative type of reasoning,
see note 8 supra and accompanying text, and concluded that heroin is such a seductive and
addicting drug that if it were freely available the enormous number of its users would produce
a national catastrophe. As a policy choice, therefore, the law has been structured so that heroin
is extremely expensive. This perhaps lowers the number of addicts in the society, but it consider-
ably magnifies the damage they do to others.
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the antibiotics, where danger to others arises because exposure to an
antibiotic tends to generate sttains of bacteria resistant to it.2 Others
are damaged, then, simply because they are deprived of a valuable-in-
deed, perhaps life saving-medicine. This may, of course, happen
as a result of medical practice as well, but where the antibiotic is used
promiscuously-and a conclusive presumption seems to have been
adopted that it will be promiscuously used if not under medical super-
vision, and, perhaps less realistically, that it will not be so used if
under supervision-this hazard is considerably increased.
Despite these instances where drug use may damage others, it is
fairly clear that the overwhelming danger in drug use is the danger to
the user himself. Thus, the number of homicides committed under the
influence of alcohol is dwarfed by the death rate of the users them-
selves from cirrhosis and other alcoholism-related diseases.6 3 The dan-
gers of tobacco to its users in terms of lung cancer, emphysema and
various circulatory diseases far outweigh the damage done by smok-
ing-caused fires.64 Even heroin, harmful as it is to society, is, under
contemporary conditions, far more destructive to its users than to
others.65 And the cost of the antibiotic-resistant bacteriuin is typically
borne by the first sufferer from the improper use of antibiotics. 6
With regard then to the damage to the drug user himself, there is
a widely used term: drug abuse. Drug abuse means simply the use of
a drug so that it interferes with either the user's physical or mental
health, or his adjustment in society.67 It is important to understand
that this is a definition which applies to both legal and illegal drugs.
A classic example of just how the issue of the legality of a drug can
interfere with the understanding of what is meant by drug abuse is
provided by the American Medical Association. Until quite recently
the AMA defined drug abuse as either the over-use of a legal drug so
62. See GOODMAN & GILMAN 1157-58.
63. See BLOOMQUIST 180-81; BLUM 284-85; GOODMAN & GILMAN 135-44; T. PLAUT, AL-
COHOL PROBLEMS: A REPORT TO THE NATION BY THE COOPERATIVE COMMISSION ON TuE
STUDY OF ALCOHOL (1967). See also N. KESSEL & H. WALToM, ALCOHOLISM 30, 32-34 (1967);
Moskow, Pennington & Knisely, Alcohol, Sludge, and Hypoxic Areas of Nervous System, Liver
and Heart, I MICROVASCULAR RESEARCH 174 (1968).
64. See KAPLAN 201, 314.
65. See GOODMAN & GILMAN 237-55; KAPLAN 314; Baden, Deaths from Heroin Addiction
among Teenagers in New York City (August 18, 1970) (unpublished paper presented at the
Second World Meeting on Medical Law, Washington, D.C.).
66. See A. GOTH, MEDICAL PHARMACOLOGY 509-10 (5th ed. 1970).




as to impair one's physical or mental health or his adjustment in
society, or any use of an illegal drug.6" Such a definition merely
incorporates legal standards into medical practice. It does not make
a great deal of sense, for example, to define every marijuana user as
a drug abuser while insisting that only the alcoholic, but not the social
drinker, is an abuser of alcohol. The fact is that, as in the case of
alcohol, at least some marijuana users, who use the drug in modera-
tion, use it without any danger to themselves-aside, of course, from
that of getting caught.
Indeed, one of the main fallacies in the present societal approach
to the drug problem is that the illegal drugs are too often regarded as
terribly dangerous and the legal drugs as perfectly safe. It is true, of
course, that some drugs have a much greater potential for abuse than
others, in that they injure a higher percentage of their users. But an
injury produced by drug abuse is typically caused by a complex com-
bination of the drug itself, the way it is used, the disposition of the
person using it and the conditions under which it is used. 9 Some
people, for instance, can apparently use heroin for quite a while with-
out becoming addicted or otherwise harming themselves, though this
would probably represent a very small percentage of users. There are,
on the other hand, those who injure themselves with coffee, the "most
legal" of our legal drugs. Though we cannot verify whether Honore
de Balzac, as is sometimes said, really did die from excessive coffee
use, it is indisputable that the coffee user may damage himself in
various ways. 70 Some coffee users notice that their stomachs are al-
ways upset and that they have great trouble sleeping. Many of them
stop using coffee; others just get used to having upset stomachs and
insomnia, because coffee can be strongly habit-forming to some peo-
ple. 71 It should be mentioned also that research on the genetic damage
caused by various drugs has in the last five" years pointed a considera-
bly more suspicious finger at coffee than at several other drugs far
more implicated in the public press.72 Similarly unconfirmed, but
68. See E. GOODE, THE MARIJUANA SMOKERS 100 (1970).
69. See BLUM 230, 277-80, 284; NOWLIS 17-19.
70. Goldstein, Kaizer & Warren, Psychotropic Effects of Caffeine in Man. I. Individual
Differences in Sensitivity to Caffeine-induced Wakefulness, 149 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERI-
MENTAL THERAPEUTICS 156 (1965).
71. Goldstein, Kaizer & Whitby, Psychotropic Effects of Caffeine in Man. IV. Quantitative
and Qualitative Differences Associated with Habituation to Coffee, 10 CLINICAL PHARMACOL-
OGY & THERAPEUTICS 489 (1969).
72. Caffeine has been found to be mutagenic in fungi, bacteria, plants, mice and Drosophila.
Goldstein & Warren, Lack of Relationship Between Gastric Carcinoma and Intake of Beverages
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suspicious, findings indicate a possible connection between coffee
drinking and cancer of the blbdder. 73 Differences of degree and kind
are, however, important and a legal system which made no distinction
between heroin and coffee would leave a great deal to be desired.
It is possible that if more were known about drugs it could be said
that it is not that some drugs are more dangerous than others, but
rather that certain drugs are more dangerous to specific types of
people. Moreover, with sufficient knowledge about both drugs and
people it is possible that they could be matched as accurately as are
diabetics and sugar. It might also be possible to define with some
precision who will be injured by a given drug. Unfortunately, it tran-
scends the limits of present knowledge to say more than that certain
types of people seem more vulnerable to one drug than another, and,
as a result, society tends to proceed by making general rules about
drugs based in part upon a feeling as to their overall danger.
MODELS OF DRUG CONTROL
In order to better understand the control of drug abuse, it will be
instructive to note the various models that our society has adopted to
control different types of drugs.
Coffee
Coffee may be sold and used in all nations, although at times its
use has been punishable by imprisonment or death.74 Although in
many countries coffee bears a tax that is disproportionate to the taxes
on other imported foodstuffs, in this country no legal effort is aimed
at discouraging its use.75 The fact that it is a drug which injures at
least some of its users76 seems to be reflected solely in non-legal, social
controls-for example, the sight of an eight-year-old having a cup of
coffee is sufficiently remarkable to be remembered for some while.
Containing Caffeine, 15 CANCER 1261, 1261 (1962). Kuhlmann, Fromme, Heege & Ostertag,
The Mutagenic Action of Caffeine in Higher Organisms, 28 CANCER RESEARCII 2375 (1968).
In one study caffeine induced chromatid breakages in human cells in vitro.
73. See Cole, Coffee-Drinking and Cancer of the Lower Urinary Tract, I LANCET 1335
(1971).
74. BLUM 11-12.
75. See NOWLIS 113.




The regulations on tobacco are slightly more onerous than those
on coffee. It is taxed far more heavily than most other consumables, 77
its advertising is restricted, 7 and its sale to minors is purportedly
forbidden, 79 though in fact no attention is usually paid to this last
restriction. Recently, cigarette manufacturers were required to put a
notice on the packages saying that "The Surgeon General Has Deter-
mined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health.""0
Finally, considerable amounts of money are spent to convince users
of the harmfulness of this drug though nothing remotely approaching
either the amounts taken in through the taxes on tobacco or the
amounts spent by the cigarette industry to promote its sale.
Alcohol
To describe completely the present controls on alcohol would take
a sizeable book. It is a drug which causes enormous social havoc81 and
is dangerous to a fairly sizeable proportion of those who use it.2 To
prevent its use altogether, the United States and several other western
countries have, for brief periods, tried a prohibition which made the
manufacture and sale-and in some countries the use-of alcoholic
beverages a crime. 3 This type of control, however, has almost every-
where been abandoned and is used today only in certain Moslem
countries where it is supported by a strong religious taboo. 4 Present
methods of control are less ambitious but are generally regarded as
more successful: the drug is sold through either a government monop-
oly or license,8 5 which is restricted to those of good moral character,
it is heavily taxed, and there are strong controls on its sale to those
under the age of 18 or 21, depending on the state. Moreover, its
77. KAPLAN 313.
78. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (WEST 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2357, 2358
(Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20-5 (McKinney 1967).
80. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
81. "[A]lcohol has probably caused more disease than any other drug in man's history. It
is a major cause of social disability. There are at least 2,500,000 socially useless alcoholics in
this country and about as many whose productivity is curtailed by alcohol. ... Modell,
supra note 52, at 347.
82. See BLOOMIQUIST 180-88 (13% of alcohol users are alcoholic); BLUmt 42 (7%).
83. See BLUM 34, 37-39; SINCLAIR 335.
84. BLUm, 238.
85. For an exposition of the detail of the licensing system, see KAPLAN 335-41. A licensing
system for marijuana is discussed at length at notes 131-38 infra and accompanying text.
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advertising is restricted and sale is forbidden close to schools or
churches."6 Furthermore, several states have "rationing" systems,
while others have "posting" laws whereby a public official can deter-
mine whether an individual is abusing alcohol and thereby make it
illegal for anyone to give or sell it to him. Finally, although in this
nation little is spent to warn the public against the dangers of alcohol-
ism, this method of control is not unknown.8"
Cyclamates
The control of cyclamates exemplifies the next model of drug reg-
ulation-though this type of regulation is more commonly applied to
conduct other than that associated with supply and use of drugs.88
This is called the vice model because it is the type of legal regulation
best known for its application to vices such as gambling and prostitu-
tion.89 Where the vice model is applied to commodities or services
which may injure their user, the seller is made guilty, but not the
buyer. The theory behind this distinction is that sufficient control may
be exercised over a product by using the criminal law to try to deter
suppliers, without attempting to apply the criminal sanction to the far
larger number of users. 0 Just as public policy demands the protection
of motorists and passengers from traumatic injury caused by automo-
biles which lack seat belts or padded dashboards, through the exertion
of pressure to prevent these dangerous instrumentalities from being
sold, so it protects people from cancer of the bladder" t-which they
may get from dietetic soft drinks containing cyclamates (if they turn
out to have a metabolism like a rat's and drink enormous quanti-
86. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25608 (West 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43,
§ 127 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL LAW § 64 (McKinney 1970).
87. France, for example, which has an even more acute problem than does the United States,
devotes considerable effort to public information on its dangers. BLuM1 240.
88. It has previously been discussed in connection with the laws which might make it
criminal to manufacture or sell automobiles which were not equipped with seatbelts. See notes
29-30 supra and accompanying text.
89. See generally KAPLAN 315-30.
90. The explanation usually given for the differentiation is that the buyer is merely a victim
who needs help not punishment, whereas the seller is guilty of the evil of exploiting the weak-
nesses of others. Id. at 316.
91. See 34 Fed. Reg. 17063-64 (1969), where the Food and Drug Administration found that
cyclamates were not safe for use in food.
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ties). 92 Probably the most interesting thing about the control of cycla-
mates is that it works.9 3
Antibiotics
The next type of drug control is that used for antibiotics-the
medical model.9 This model seems to be the preferred one for drugs
which meet three conditions--drugs that have medical uses, that are
capable of harming their user, and that are not especially sought by
illegal users. Under the medical model, the medical profession is given
control of the right to obtain the drug. The ordinary citizen can
purchase it if and only if he has the permission of a physician who is
given almost uncontrolled discretion as to whether he will make the
prescription. If the physician approves, he will give the drug user a
prescription which will allow a licensed pharmacist to sell the pre-
scribed quantity. If the user does not have a prescription, but can still
get someone to sell him the drug, he will commit no crime, but the
seller will be guilty of a criminal offense-or, more significantly, if a
pharmacist, he may lose his license.95 In short, the cyclamate or
"vice" model, punishing the seller, but not the user, is applied to
medical drugs used without a prescription.
Amphetamines and Barbiturates
The amphetamines and barbiturates resemble the antibiotics in
that they both have legitimate medical uses and can harm a certain
percentage of their users. They differ, however, from the antbiotic-like
drugs in that they are in substantial demand for non-medical, or
recreational purposes. Although jurisdictions differ in how they treat
this non-medical use, the modern trend has been to decide that the vice
92. The methods and results of the study which caused the removal of cyclamates from the
FDA's "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) list of chemical substances used as food addi-
tives are detailed in Price, Biava, Oser, Vogin, Steinfeld & Ley, Bladder Tumors in Rats Fed
Cyclohexylamine or High Doses of a.Mixture of Cyclamate and Saccharin, 167 SCIENCE 1131
(1970), which also discusses the history of research dealing with cyclamates, and the particular
steps leading to their ban. The dispute as to whether the ban was required, or even prudent, has
been intense. Compare Letter, Inborn & Meisner, Cyclamate Ban, 166 SCIENCE 685 (1969)
(expressing alarm that such a beneficial substance would be banned on such inconclusive evid-
ence) with Letter, Epstein, Hollaender, Lederberg, Legator, Richardson & Wolff, Wisdom of
Cyclamate Ban, id. at 1575 (that a substance without demonstrable matching benefits should
be banned when it is possible it represents a long-run danger).
93. See p. 1094 infra and accompanying text.
94. See generally KAPLAN 330-32.
95. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 4227, 4350, 4363 (West Supp. 1971).
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model is not sufficient. As a result, we have tended to treat the non-
medical users of these drugs like the helmetless cyclists-that is, to
deter them through the threat of criminal penalties."
Marijuana and Heroin
Finally, there are the drugs such as marijuana and heroin which
are subject to complete prohibition. Since these drugs have no "recog-
nized" medical use, the medical model cannot be applied, and, be-
cause they are considered too dangerous, the vice, or cyclamate,
model is also unavailable. As a result both sale and use of these drugs
is criminal-without the safety valve provided by the amphetamine
and barbiturate model where medical practice diverts a sizeable per-
centage of the drug use into legal channels.
.Other Models
Two things should be noted about the models of legal treatment
applied to these various drugs. First, although the differing treatments
cover an enormous range, additional legal models could be devised.
It has been suggested by some advocates of marijuana legalization
who fear commercialization, for example, that the "flower children"
model should be adopted.9" By this model, all taint of commerciali-
zation would be removed by a law which permitted anyone to grow
the drug for himself and use or give away as much as he wished. The
only act that would be forbidden would be sale. Interestingly enough,
this is a model which bears some relation to the treatment of prostitu-
tion-apparently, there are certain things that can be given away but
should not be sold. On the other hand, the fact that the legal treatment
of prostitution has not been what could be called one of the law's
greater successes, may be a good reason to be cautious about adopting
the "flower children" model.
Second, the assignment of drugs to the various categories, while
to a certain extent determined by the dangers of the drug in question,
is also subject to a host of other factors. Some forty years ago alcohol
in the United States was treated according to a combination of
various other models. It was available on prescription from a physi-
cian or for religious or sacramental purposes, but the manufacture,
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1970).
97. Aldrich, Notes on Structuring Legal Sale of Marijuana to Minimize Abuse (Aug. 15,
1971) (mimeo publication by AMORPHIA).
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sale, or even use outside of these, and a few other narrow exceptions,
was criminal." It is interesting to note that at this same time a mari-
juana extract was treated according to the medical model.9 The as-
signment of models of control to drugs varies both from nation to
nation and over time. Thus, heroin is treated under the medical model
in England' today while in Sweden amphetamines are essentially
prohibited entirely.
The question, of course, raised by the large variation in the models
by which drug use is controlled is how a rational society should
allocate drugs among the different methods of legal treatment. Rather
than attempting to lay down a systematic decisional process, six prin-
ciples will be presented which should be kept in mind when deciding
which models should be applied to which drugs.
PRINCIPLES OF DRUG CONTROL
Principle I: It is hard, if not impossible, to justify a criminal law
which punishes the drug user himself
As was noted in discussing the helmetless cyclist case, it is rela-
tively rare for the criminal law to force a person to take better care
of himself. The drug area is probably the major exception to this rule
since with respect to all the commonly used illegal drugs, the user,
along with the seller, is subject to the criminal law. However, while
the helmetless cyclist case was unusual in that the high visibility of
the violation made enforcement of the law a comparatively easy task,
the exact opposite is true with respect to drug use. Even though at-
tempts are made to make the proscription of drug use more easily
enforceable by outlawing possession as a surrogate for the forbidden
drug use,'"' possession of a small amount of a substance is extremely
difficult to detect-except through search, which is an expensive,
time-consuming and resented police activity. Indeed, possession of a
drug by a user is close to the opposite pole of detectability from the
case of the helmetless cyclist.
98. See generally SINCLAIR 410-11; C. WARBURTON, THE ECONOMIC RESULTS OF
PROHIBITION 67-69 (1932).
99. S. SNYDER, THE USES OF MARIJUANA (1971).
100. M. GLATT, D. PITTMAN, D. GILLESPIE & D. HIELS, THE DRUG SCENE IN GREAT
BRITAIN 100-01 (1967); E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS 152-56 (1965); Stimson, The
Patterns of Behavior of Heroin Addicts (September, 1971) (unpublished paper, Addiction Re-
search Unit, Institute of Psychiatry, London); Cardner & Connell, One Year's Experience in a
Drug Dependence Clinic, 2 LANCET 455 (1970).
101. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11500 (West Supp. 1971).
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Moreover, since the overwhelming reason for applying the crimi-
nal law to the drug user is to protect him from himself, the law is
caught in a conundrum. Insofar as the drug itself is dangerous, there
is, all other things being equal, a better reason to try to discourage
its use. To the extent that the criminal law is expected to deter this
use, however, it is obviously least effective against those who are so
oblivious to the consequences of their actions as to be willing to use
the harmful drug in the first place. Those who can be influenced by
the threats of harm imposed by the criminal law, on the other hand,
will find such threats unnecessary since they are more likely to be
deterred by the danger of the drug alone. Nor is the case for criminal
treatment of the drug user any stronger in the case of less dangerous
drugs. Here the strictures of the criminal law will be effective in
discouraging use by potential users who would not be deterred by the
lesser dangers of the drug. As the ddngers of drug abuse grow less,
however, the case for expending societal resources on the task of
protecting users from themselves grows progressively weaker.
The major theoretical case for detering drug users from harming
themselves, then, exists in the case of a drug which is in fact very
dangerous but which is not seen to be so by the public. Presumably
criminal prosecution might then supplement education. It turns out,
however, that the criminal law is an anti-educative device, at least to
those who are most likely to use illegal drugs.' They tend to oppose
law enforcement to begin with and will tend to see such drug educa-
tion simply as a means of getting them to obey the law. Moreover,
the idea that legislators will know more about the dangers of drugs
than those who use them has been refuted by every survey that has
been conducted on the issue.
Similarly, none of the other purposes of the criminal law argue
for its application to the drug user himself. Even assuming that the
criminal law can reform drug users-a most unrealistic assumption
based on today's knowledge-this is extremely expensive.0 3 Even if
the imprisonment and consequent reformation of drug users is seen
as a method of avoiding secondary harms, any rational calculus will
tell us that this is more expensive than enduring the secondary harms
themselves. The disparity becomes even greater if it is recognized that
102. Kaplan, Drug Laws Handicapping Control and Education 4, at I CLINICAL
ToxICOLOGY 141, 142-43 (1971).
103. The cost of the marijuana laws, for example, is explored in KAPLAN 21-48.
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any proper method of cost accounting will attribute the cost of efforts
to arrest and convict all drug users to the "cures" of the relatively
few who are actually caught or driven into treatment programs.
The argument for penalizing the drug user himself becomes even
weaker when it is remembered that the alternative is not necessarily
the allowance of completely uncontrolled sale and merchandising. As
has been seen, there is a whole arsenal of other control strategies
available.104 The vice model, for instance, can typically restrict the
supply almost as well as a complete prohibition at the considerably
lower cost of enforcement which results from concentration on the
much smaller number of traffickers, at least as compared with ordi-
nary users. 10 5
There are, however, at least in theory, two situations where one
might wish to consider a criminal law applied to the drug user himself.
First, the drug user could be considered a source of contagion who
might be "quarantined" through use of the criminal law. There are,
however, several practical defects in such a justification. Though it
might make sense where there are few users of the drug, in this coun-
try the simple fact is that society is unable to catch nearly a high
enough percentage of drug users to significantly impede this kind of
contagion. Moreover, when they are caught the drug users are typi-
cally placed in a jail and exposed there to those most, rather than
least, susceptible to the contagion. The threat of prosecution, further-
more, exerts strong pressure in driving drug users into a distinct
subculture from which their recruiting efforts can be most successful.
Finally, the mere act of prosecuting drug users gives them a publicity
and dramatic appeal which may increase the attraction of the life style
for those who are most susceptible to the very contagion against
which the law is trying to guard.'
Second, it is conceivable that a drug might move such a high
percentage of its users to crimes against others that use of the drug
would be an accurate predictor of such conduct. In that case, drug
use could be treated as an inchoate crime against others, not unlike
recklessness on the highway or criminal attempt. Even John Stuart
Mill conceded that mere drunkenness itself might be a crime in one
104. See notes 75-98 supra and accompanying text.
105. See KAPLAN 316.
106. This process, of course, is the antithesis of the "modelling" justification often used to
justify drug control. See notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
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"who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under
the influence of drink."' 7 If there were a drug which was sufficiently
predictive of acts of violence, it might make sense to treat its posses-
sion like possession of a sawed-off shotgun. With all drugs known
today, except heroin, any rationale based upon the risk of harm to
others, let alone violent crime, is challengeable on factual grounds."'
With respect to heroin, however, it can admittedly be argued that its
use is a sufficient predictor of criminal acts, at least in those without
any legal source of sufficient income to maintain a drug habit."' This
is so notwithstanding the irony that it is the law itself that is an equal
cause of the addict's crime. Methadone maintenance programs have,
on the other hand, already shown dramatic ability to decrease the
criminality of a sizeable percentage of heroin addicts,"" and, at least
until this type of solution is shown to be inadequate, it makes rela-
tively little sense to use the far mdre expensive and less effective
methods of punishing the drug user himself.
Principle II: Drugs do people good as well as harm
Because drugs do people good as well as harm, when one considers
reducing the abuse of a drug through a legal measure, he should also
consider the corresponding reduction of the drug's beneficial use
which the measure will cause. Thus, even if a drug prohibition were
effective at preventing all use of a drug, this may not always be a cause
for satisfaction because the good the drug might have done may very
well exceed the harm prevented by its suppression.
This principle has been most often discussed With respect to medi-
cal drugs-even though the medical model"' seems best adapted to
distinguishing between beneficial and harmful use, since it allows
physicians to make the determination on a case by case basis. The
problem also arises, however, with respect to the "new" drugs that
are being tested for approval. It has been alleged that bureaucratic
drug administration has imposed unrealistic and expensive testing
107. MILL 115-16.
108. See generally NOWLIS.
109. BLUM 288-89. See also KAPLAN 240.
110. See Brill & Chambers, A Multimodality Approach to Methadone Treatment of Nar-
cotic Addicts, 16 SOCIAL WORK 39 (1971); Dole & Nyswander, Rehabilitation of Heroin Ad-
dicts After Blockade with Methadone, 66 N.Y. ST. J. OF MED. 2011, 2012, 2016 (1966). But
cf Vaillant, A Twelve Year Follow-up of New York Narcotic Addicts: Part I. The Relation
of Treatment to Outcome, 122 ANI. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 727, 730, 736 (1966).
I1I. See notes 94-95 supra and accompanying text.
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standards which must be met prior to putting a drug on the market. 12
Many observers have felt that although the protection afforded by
these standards against another thalidomide disaster is very impor-
tant, the harm done to society by unnecessarily keeping beneficial
drugs off the market may outweigh the more demonstrable harm
caused by allowing the prescription of potentially harmful drugs.113
Whether or not these charges are correct, it must be remembered that
the evaluation of medical drugs has been turned over to a bureaucracy
and that there is a constant and strong tendency for a bureaucrat to
prefer invisible to visible errors. Since he will suffer far less attack if
he keeps a valuable drug off the market than if a drug he has passed
does harm, the bureaucrat will always tend toward a caution which
may be damaging to society as a whole.
It is even possible that this principle may have application to the
cyclamates. There might be many people, for example, who should
rationally take their chances on the relatively unlikely possibility of
bladder cancer caused by cyclamates, rather than face the more cer-
tain health dangers of obesity. If the long-term health consequences
of putting on too much weight are considered, it may be that the
population as a whole would suffer greater injury from being over-
weight than from the threat of cancer in a small percentage of users.1 4
The cyclamates point up another aspect of this problem. With the
possible exception of some medical "wonder" drugs, the good that a
drug does will tend to be more widespread, but far less dramatic, than
the harm. Even in the case of alcohol where the medical harm clearly
outweighs the good, and in the case of marijuana where the issue is
subject to acrimonious debate, there is no doubt that there are many
people who avoid serious mental problems by relaxing and reducing
anxiety with one or the other of these drugs. In the case of both
alcohol and marijuana, then, one might still decide that complete
112. See, e.g., Djerassi, Birth Control After 1984, 169 SCIENCE 941,942-43 (1970); Djerassi,
Prognosis for the Development of New Chemical Birth-Control Agents, 166 SCIENCE 468, 469,
471 (1969) (both articles dealing with the questionable requirements of using animals to test
oral contraceptives for human use).
113. Djerassi, Birth Control After 1984, supra note 112, at 949; Djerassi, Prognosis, supra
note 112, at 470.
114. See generally Hatch, Atherosclerosis Calls for a New Kind of Preventive Medicine,
109 CALIF. MED. 134, 136-37 (1968). See also Dawber, Moore & Mann, Coronary Heart Disease
in the Framingham Study, 47 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 4 (Supp. April, 1957); M. Duffy, Obesity




prohibition is the best social response if it could be made to work at
a cost proportional to its benefits. However, one would then have to
consider not only the social and financial cost of making the prohibi-
tion work, but the restriction of beneficial use as well.
Attention will be later focused on the often neglected point that
the greater the number of users who consider their drug use beneficial,
the harder it will be to make the prohibition work. At this point it is
necessary only to note that prohibition may well discourage the bene-
ficial use much more effectively than the harmful use. The person who
is dependent on and desperately needs a drug is likely not only to be
the one who will work hardest to get it but also the one most likely
to injure himself with it. In some situations the law works well to keep
people from using a drug who might benefit from it but is relatively
ineffectual to prevent use by those who harm themselves. n5 The mari-
juana laws today, and, so far as can be told, the prohibition of earlier
years, discouraged moderate use by older more stable and cautious
members of society far more than they deterred the younger, more
unstable and less forward looking, who in fact are much more likely
to become abusers." 6
Principle M1.: An important factor in the success or failure of any
method of drug control is the degree to which the users want the drug
This is one major reason why when the government ordered cycla-
mates off the market they simply disappeared, whereas alcohol during
prohibition, and marijuana more recently, did not. The cyclamates
could be successfully barred in great part because most users really
did not want them very much. They were only used to save calories,
and calories, could be almost as effectively reduced in other ways.
Although cyclamates did not have the bitter after-taste of saccharine,
a combination of saccharine and a small amount of sugar was a
sufficient substitute for most people. Nor did cyclamates, unlike her-
oin for instance, produce either addiction or psychological depen-
dence to make its users seek the drug at substantial personal cost.
Consequently, the illegal seller of cyclamates did not have a very good
market.
115. See KAPLAN 323-26. See generally R. STEFFENHAGEN & P. LEAHY, A STUDY OF DRUG
USE PATTERNS OF HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IN THE STATE OF VERMONT (1969).
116. C. Warburton, supra note 98, at 233-42; Sinclair 238-41. Sie generally CHAMBERS,
DIFFERENTIAL DRUG USE WITHIN THE NEw YORK STATE LABOR FORCE (New York State
Narcotic Addiction Control Commission, 1971).
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Compare marijuana or alcohol to the cyclamates. Both cause
dependence, 1 7 though to only a relatively small number of users and
they give considerable pleasure to a high proportion of the rest. The
users of each of these "social" drugs do not, in addition, seem to
recognize substitutes for their drugs, as was the case with cyclamates.
They are not, then, presented with easily available alternatives so as
to make unnecessary their efforts to procure alcohol or marijuana.
Principle IV The technology of drug production and consumption
is an important factor in the success or failure of a drug control
measure
Where the technology of drug production and distribution is not
difficult to overcome, drug control will be very difficult, but where
that is not the case, the control will be far more effective. Take, for
example, the cyclamates. Although they do not take a great deal of
technology or invested capital, unlike amphetamines they are not
easily divertible from normal chains of commerce; unlike marijuana,
they are neither grown wild in nature nor produced in less developed
countries beyond the effective reach of law enforcement; and, unlike
alcohol, they cannot easily be distilled in anyone's basement from
completely untraceable ingredients. Moreover, so long as cyclamates
are consumed in cans of diet drinks selling for ten or fifteen cents
each, it would hardly be economical to transport large quantities of
such beverages illegally; a truckload of such diet drinks would be
considerably less valuable than a pocketfull of heroin, a small suitcase
full of marijuana or a car full of alcohol. Of course, if there were a
sufficient demand for cyclamates, and if the technology of production
were simpler, it might be that legitimate business would produce non-
sweet soft drinks to which the illegal drug user could add his cycla-
mates-much as large amounts of cigarette papers and water pipes
are now sold and which, for the most part, end up being used with
illegal marijuana. Until this level is reached, however, the technology
of production and distribution helps make the cyclamates an example
of effective drug control.
Principle V: The social cost of a drug control law can be staggering
Insofar as a drug control law accomplishes its object of preventing
drug abuse, it will typically not be very costly. In the case of the
117. KAPLAN 156-67, 270-76.
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cyclamates, the only cost of preventing its harmful use is that a good
deal of valuable use is also prevented-which, if more were known,
might turn out to be perfectly safe. And where a drug is controlled
by the medical model, its major cost is the amount of medical time
and effort it takes to run the system which must be paid for by the
drug user.
Where the drug control law is widely violated, however, its costs
can rise staggeringly. The alcohol trade during prohibition not only
led to the vast expansion of organized crime in America and enor-
mous official corruption,"' but it added a new danger to the health
of the nation as well. Although alcohol distillers did not generally sell
methyl alcohol mixed with their liquor before or after prohibition,
during prohibition many bootleggers did and caused a sizeable num-
ber of injuries to the unfortunate people who consumed it.
Even if one supports the present prohibition of the heroin laws
because of the fear of vastly greater heroin addiction, he must recog-
nize that in so doing he pays an enormous price in addict criminality.
A major effect of the heroin laws has been to create, in Professor
Packer's term, a "crime tariff" which raises the price of the drug to
many times what it would be in a competitive market." 9 It is the price
of the drug rather than addiction itself which requires addicts to turn
to crime. Crime is necessary not so much because heroin prevents the
addict from holding down a legitimate job, but because only crime
can permit the relatively uneducated addict to earn enough to feed his
habit. Moreover, heroin is not only a very addicting drug, it is also a
drug which causes a "tolerance"-a gradual increase in the amount
necessary for the user to gain a constant effect.' This gradually
socializes the addict into criminality and makes sure that his need
increases as he becomes a more experienced criminal. Although many
addicts support their habit through the sale of heroin, users cannot
make a living by simply selling to each other. Sooner or later the
community outside must be victimized through property crimes or the
manufacture of new addicts-who in turn repeat the same process.
Finally, the cost of the heroin laws in terms of police corruption and
erosion of civil liberties is impossible to measure.
The marijuana laws, perhaps, best demonstrate the heavy costs
118. See PACKER 277-82.
119. PACKER 277-82.
120. Martin & Jasinski, Physiological Parameters of Morphine Dependence in Man-Toler-
ance, Early Abstinence, Protracted Abstinence, 7 J. PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH 9 (1969).
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that may be paid for attempts to control drug use.121 Some of these
costs could, of course, be reduced by substituting the vice model for
the present prohibition-and this would be the very least demanded by
Principle I. Such a change would vastly reduce the enormous expendi-
ture of resources used in processing users. The great majority, over
ninety percent, of the 70,000 marijuana arrests made during 1970 in
California were of users possessing only small amounts of the drug,
and almost as large a percentage of the cost of processing offenders
through the criminal system was spent upon users.122
It is hard to prove with equal precision the other costs of criminal-
izing the possession of marijuana-though we should expect fairly
sizeable costs from a law which turns approximately one-third of
young Americans into unrepentant criminals.123 It cannot be proven,
but it is suspected that no generation of young people since prohibi-
tion has grown up as profoundly distrustful of the police and the law
enforcement apparatus as has our present younger generation. It cer-
tainly is undeniable that anyone who smokes marijuana cannot possi-
bly consider the policeman as his friend and protector as many Amer-
icans were brought up to do. Indeed, if one could somehow graph the
hostility of young people toward the police with the increasing use of
marijuana, he would find two sharply increasing and probably paral-
lel curves.
The police are by no means the only major institution of our
society which has been alienated from the young by the marijuana
laws. Examine, for instance, organized medicine. Just a few months
ago, the President-elect of the American Medical Association was
widely quoted to the effect that the Association had evidence that
marijuana use caused impotence and birth defects."2 ' Although he
later admitted that he knew of no such evidence, he said that he had
allowed the misrepresentations to stand because he wished to discour-
age marijuana use.12 As he put it, "If I am taken out of context and
it does some good, I don't mind." When asked about the loss of
121. See KAPLAN 21-52. The marijuana laws themselves are extensively discussed in Bonnie
& Whitebread, supra note 22.
122. See BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS, DRUG ARRESTS AND DISPOSITIONS: CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA, 1970 1 (1971). See also KAPLAN 29.
123. KAPLAN 22-26.
124. The criminalization of marijuana may, in fact, be the single most unifying and recruit-
ing agent available to the counter-culture of the New Left. See Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note
22, at 1098.
125. McCabe, Clamor in the AMA, San Francisco Chronicle, April 7, 1971, at 51.
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creaibility among the young caused by this type of authoritative mis-
representation, he said, "I'm tired of these phrases about credibility
gap and such. We're talking about the morality of our country and
the loss of respect of law and order and authority and decency." 12
In short, an attempt to support the marijuana laws led directly to the
view that it was permissible to mislead young people in order to get
them to respect authority and decency. Because of this type of well-
publicized incident-as well as the almost equally well known lower-
ing of scientific standards by the Journal of the American Medical
Association to print articles exaggerating dangers of marijuana121-it
is extremely unlikely that organized medicine will ever enjoy again the
credibility with young people that it had before the marijuana laws
became an issue-even on questions where it is not attempting to
compel respect for authority.
These costs, which are for the most part attributable to the deci-
sion to make marijuana use criminal, do not exhaust the costs of the
marijuana laws. Even the adoption of a vice model would still impose
enormous costs upon society. Because of Principles III and IV, the
law would almost certainly remain unenforceable and as a result, the
marijuana laws would continue in several ways to contribute to the
use of drugs which by any standard are far more dangerous than
marijuana. Since drug education is the most important long-term
solution to drug abuse,' the marijuana laws would continue to inhibit
educating young people about the dangers of heroin, LSD, amphet-
amines, and other drugs. Although education as to drugs other than
marijuana can be extremely factual and yet effective, the fact that
drug education must also support the marijuana laws destroys a great
part of its credibility. 29 The reason for this-as grasped intuitively by
the President-elect of the American Medical Association-is that the
only way to defend to young people the gross disparity between the
legal treatment of marijuana and alcohol is to attempt to mislead
them about the facts. The problem is that such attempts generally fail,
126. San Jose Mercury, March 25, 1971, at 17, col. 1.
127. See, e.g., Kolansky & Moore, Effects of Marihuana on Adolescents and Young Adults,
216 J.A.M.A. 486 (1971). See generally BLOOMQUIST 225-30.
128. It is interesting to note that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics went to great lengths in
the thirties to educate the public as to the purported evils of marijuana. This miseducation has
had a lasting effect. See J. FORT, THE PLEASURE SEEKERS 69-71 (1969); Grinspoon, supra note
8, at 20-22.
129. Kaplan, supra note 84.
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destroying in the process the factual and honest efforts to educate
against the use of other more dangerous drugs.
Second, by forbidding the legal sale of marijuana society will
continue, in effect, to give a monopoly on marijuana sale to drug
pushers. This will continue to bring all those who would use mari-
juana into contact with a group which already risks severe penalties
for selling it, and, therefore, has every incentive to deal in higher profit
items such as LSD, amphetamines or heroin. One can liken this to
what would happen if a monopoly of all coffee sales were given to one
supermarket chain. Not only would their sale of coffee skyrocket, but
so would sales of just about everything else because those who were
in the store would be available for a hard sell on other products. It is
no different with illegal commodities and, just as prohibition had to
be repealed to get the "mob" out of the liquor business, 3 ' marijuana
will have to be sold under license by legitimate businessmen to get the
drug pushers out of the marijuana business.13,
Principle VI: Marijuana is the key drug, and until substantial prog-
ress is made in controlling it, little real progress can be made on the
other areas of drug control
In order to understand why a licensing system for marijuana is
necessary, it must be remembered first that marijuana is by far the
most widely used illegal drug in the nation; second, that it is typically
the first illegal drug used by those who later use more dangerous
drugs; third, that the popularity and relative lack of danger of mari-
juana tends to make all illegal drug-taking somewhat more respect-
able; fourth, that attempts to defend the legal treatment of marijuana,
especially as compared with alcohol, have compromised the educa-
tional effort to reduce use of more dangerous drugs; and fifth, that
the marijuana market has called into being an elaborate drug-dealing
subculture which is instrumental in the sale of, and proselytizing for,
other illegal drugs.132
One method of ending the central position of marijuana would,
in theory, be to enforce marijuana laws and actually stamp out the
drug. As previously discussed, however, this simply cannot be accom-
130. SINCLAIR 229-30, 415.
131. The requirements for such a licensing system are considered at length at notes 132-38
infra and accompanying text.
132. KAPLAN 44-45, 224-25.
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plished within the constraints imposed by the police resources at hand,
and the constitutional rights of privacy guaranteed to citizens. Indeed
one can put the matter somewhat more strongly and say that, short
of a complete police state, it will be impossible to enforce the mari-
juana laws sufficiently to change any of the five facts mentioned
above.
The application to marijuana, however, of a licensing system simi-
lar to that presently applied to alcohol changes all five drastically.
First, marijuana would no longer be the most widely used illegal drug
in the United States; nor, for that matter, would it be the most widely
used legal drug-alcohol and tobacco would still vie for that distinc-
tion. Second, marijuana would no longer be the first illegal, or the
first legal, drug used by those who later use more dangerous sub-
stances. Third, marijuana, once classified with the legal drugs, would
no longer reflect its popularity upon the illegal drugs. Fourth, the
removal of the disparity between the legal treatment of marijuana and
alcohol would allow more honesty in educating about both-while at
the same time increasing the credibility of presently honest warnings
about the more dangerous drugs. And, fifth, nothing will damage the
illegal drug dealing subculture as much as exposure to honest compe-
tition by legitimate businessmen.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF A LICENSING SYSTEM FOR MARIJUANA
Inasmuch as Principle VI is the most important application of the
other five, it will be helpful here to sketch a model of a marijuana
licensing system, as an illustration of the progress that may be made
if one applies all of the principles toward a rational system of drug
abuse control.
The administration of the licensing system would be turned over
to an agency similar to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission.
Indeed, the work of this agency would be so close to that presently
performed by the ABC that control of marijuana would probably be
added to its jurisdiction-perhaps by renaming it the Social Drug
Control Agency (SDCA). The system of control, then, would provide
that:
(I) Sufficient marijuana to meet the state's needs could be grown
under license from the SDCA by a relatively small number of land-
owners. The United States National Institute of Mental Health has
for several years now grown marijuana for research purposes on a
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fairly large scale on its farm in Mississippi, and has been able to
protect its crop from diversion and theft.133 The SDCA would have
to require similar precautions.
(2) Even in the early stages of marijuana licensing, it is likely that
the competitive market will determine the price paid to the grower.
The cost of producing it today is approximately one cent per ounce,
while the market price of the same amount is approximately fifteen
dollars. If, however, the number of licenses is, for security reasons,
kept so low as to prevent a free market from operating, the SDCA
should have the power to fix the price per ounce for different grades.
(3) Once the marijuana is grown, it would be sold to a packager-
wholesaler licensed by the SDCA to test and mix different strength
marijuanas to obtain a standard potency of 1.5 percent tetrahydro-
cannabinol-on the market today this would be regarded as "good
grass." The mixture would then be vacuum packed (because mari-
juana loses its potency over a period of months when exposed to the
air) in one-ounce containers as is pipe tobacco.
(4) Each one ounce "lid" would bear a tax of twelve dollars and
be sold for about eighteen dollars in any store licensed to sell hard
liquor. Thus, we would incorporate by reference all of the many re-
strictions on liquor stores-from the moral character of the seller to
the spatial distance between schools and churches.
(5) At least in the early stages of the marijuana licensing, where
it is important to proceed slowly and carefully, it would be illegal to
sell less than a lid, or to sell marijuana for consumption on the pre-
mises.
(6) All advertising would be forbidden except that which is done
within the liquor store.
(7) Each package of marijuana would carry a warning drafted by
an expert medical committee, fairly stating the dangers, as well as the
uncertainties of marijuana use.
(8) Sales to those under age would be prohibited under exactly the
same type of regulations that now apply to hard liquor. 3
(9) It would, of course, remain a crime to drive an automobile
133. McGlothlin, The Use and Effect of Cannabis 3, 4 (1971) (unpublished paper prepared
for the Nat'l Comm'n on Marijuana and Dangerous Drugs).
134. The age for consumption of marijuana should be 18 rather than 21. The lower age is
coming more and more to mark the line between the child and the adult. Needless to say, the
alcohol law might have to be changed as well-though there are signs that this is happening
and it is recommended by most authorities on alcoholism.
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under the influence of marijuana. Although it is not presently scien-
tifically possible to determine whether one is under the influence of
marijuana, it is likely that such a test will soon be developed. If not,
the SDCA should have the power to require that a biologically inert
material be added to legal marijuana, which can be identified in body
fluids during the period when driving might be dangerous. It should
be understood, moreover, that while present research indicates that
the marijuana intoxicated driver is more dangerous than the driver
who has consumed no drug at all, he is much less dangerous than the
drunk driver. 3 5
(10) It would be a criminal offense to sell or possess marijuana
outside the licensing system, and the selling of marijuana to one under
age would be regarded as an aggravating factor.
(11) The growing of marijuana for one's own use would be per-
mitted under strict regulation and taxation by the SDCA. Permission
would be granted subject to the same types of rights of inspection as
apply in the alcohol industry. 36 Violators would be treated as revenue
offenders, but this by no means precludes a term of imprisonment in
cases where commercial quantities are grown.
(12) The SDCA would be given power to raise or lower the tax
on marijuana. It should have the power to lower the tax if it finds that
advances in techniques of evading law enforcement have made bootleg
marijuana a serious problem at the then present price; and it should
have the power to raise the tax should it determine that more revenue
can be derived from the sale of the drug without raising the price so
high as to bring into existence an illegal market.
(13) This should be regarded as a "stripped down" licensing
model. It might turn out for instance that the SDCA would be better
off allowing more than one potency of marijuana. This might allow
a marijuana user to use a less potent form of the drug if he wishes,
while at the same time allowing the SDCA to make available a
stronger variety if desire for it had been sufficient to create an uncon-
trollable black-market.
(14) In order to permit this licensing system to function, a federal
law would have to be passed which does not forbid those activities
necessary to the furtherance of the system. This would mean, for
example, the federal law of possession and sale 31 would provide a
135. See Crancer, Dille, Delay, Wallace & Haykin, Comparison of the Effects of Marihuana
and Alcohol on Simulated Driving Performance, 164 SCIENcE 851 (1969).
136. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5202-03 (1970).




specific exception for marijuana marketed according to a state licens-
ing system. In addition, as a matter of international law, the denun-
ciation provision of the Single Convention on narcotics drugs would
have to be activated and the United States Government would have
to serve notice that it was exercising its option to withdraw from the
Convention, at least insofar as the Convention prohibited licensed
sales of marijuana. 3 '
CONCLUSION
Society must not, of course, delude itself into thinking that a
marijuana licensing system will solve all of the problems caused by
either marijuana or, a fortiori, the other, more dangerous illegal
drugs. But it will facilitate a beginning toward the application of the
rational principles of drug control to the generic problem of drug
abuse. By acting upon these principles, of which the marijuana licen-
sing system is the necessary first step, society will not be approving
of drug abuse; rather it will merely be demonstrating that there is a
limit to the costs it is willing to suffer-notwithstanding a general
commitment to save people from themselves. Until the marijuana
laws are so modified, other forms of drug abuse legislation will be
ineffective and costly, if only because new drug users will be socialized
by the drug subcultures as fast as the legal system can cope with
present users. 139
Just as marijuana control is the first step in a more generally
effective drug control system, the problem of drug abuse is but one
facet of the broader problem of using the law to protect people from
their own folly. "' Preventing self-harming conduct, however, is a basi-
cally intractable problem because voluntarily entered activities im-
pose significant secondary costs upon society.' The task of drug
control laws, then, is to minimize the social costs of both the activities
sought to be controlled and the laws enacted to control those activi-
138. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520
U.N.T.S. 151, 204 (Multilateral Treaty Between the United States of America and Other
Governments), New York, March 30, 1961, ratified by United States, 1967.
139. Thus, Richard Blum notes that "with pseudo solutions and oversimplifications, the
real problems grow worse and nonproblems are increasingly defined as problems, such as
cannabis (marijuana) use." BLUm 243.
140. The problem of self-harming conduct and society is considered in depth at notes 1-8
supra and accompanying text.
141. The nature of secondary harms associated with drug abuse are discussed at notes 9-31
supra and accompanying text.
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ties. To say that we as a society have so far done an abysmal job of
tackling that task, would be to considerably overstate our success. By
turning to somewhat more basic principles, however, it is hoped that
in the future we will do better.
